The Joe Rogan Experience (JRE) #2064 – Mike Baker

JRE 2064: Ex-CIA Operative Mike Baker Gives His Analysis on the Israel-Hamas War

The October 7th Incident, also known as the Jogan Experience, was a massive intelligence failure on the part of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Despite having agents embedded within Hamas and an intense security and surveillance system, the IDF failed to detect the operation. The planning and execution of the operation displayed an extremely high level of operational security, limiting the dissemination of information and keeping it away from Israeli intelligence.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an organization within the Iranian regime and a liaison partner for Hamas and Hezbollah, played a key role in the planning and training of Hamas operatives. The limited number of people within the IRGC who were aware of the operation ensured that the full picture was kept away from Israeli intelligence. The Israeli government became complacent due to the lack of terrorist actions for a period of time, which allowed Hamas to lull them into a false sense of security. The incident has led to various conspiracy theories, but it remains a massive intelligence failure, with occasional comments about Hamas' inclination to do something bigger leading up to the incident.

Key Takeaways

• The October 7th Incident was a massive intelligence failure on the part of the IDF, despite having agents embedded within Hamas and an intense security and surveillance system.
• The IRGC played a key role in the planning and training of Hamas operatives, limiting the dissemination of information and keeping it away from Israeli intelligence.
• The Israeli government became complacent due to the lack of terrorist actions for a period of time, which allowed Hamas to lull them into a false sense of security.

The Jogan Experience

The October 7th attack was a massive intelligence failure by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Despite having agents embedded in Hamas and an intense security and surveillance system, the IDF failed to detect the attack. The reason for this failure was due to the sophisticated operational security displayed by the attackers.

The attackers limited the dissemination of information about the operation, thereby reducing the number of people who knew about it. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an organization with the Iranian regime, managed the training of Hamas operatives in Iran prior to the attack. A limited number of individuals within the IRGC were aware of the planning and training for the operation.

The attackers' operational security was successful in keeping the attack away from Israeli intelligence. The attackers limited the number of sources who knew about the operation, which made it difficult for Israeli intelligence to gather information. Additionally, the movement of goods happened underground through the 300 miles of tunnels in Gaza that Hamas built using money that was meant for improving schools, hospitals, and other infrastructure.

The political leadership of Hamas approved the operation, but the people who really knew about it were the IRGC. The attackers displayed an extremely sophisticated level of operational security, limiting who knew about the operation and when it was going to happen.

The Israeli government became complacent and turned inward, as Hamas spent years leading up to the attack convincing the Israeli government that it was a new day and that they were looking to create a different dynamic or relationship with the Israeli government. The Israeli government became complacent and turned inward, which made it easier for Hamas to carry out the attack.

Overall, the Jogan experience was a massive intelligence failure that was due to the attackers' sophisticated operational security and the Israeli government's complacency. While some have theorized that the Israeli government allowed the attack to happen, there is no evidence to support this claim.

October 7th Incident

The October 7th incident was a massive intelligence failure for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Despite having agents embedded in Hamas and a highly sophisticated security and surveillance system, the IDF failed to detect the operation. The planning and execution of the operation displayed extremely sophisticated operational security, limiting the dissemination of information about the operation to a select few individuals. The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), an organization with the Iranian regime, was aware of the planning and training of Hamas operatives in Iran prior to October 7th. The limited number of people within the IRGC who were aware of the full picture of the operation ensured that it remained a secret from Israeli intelligence.

The movement of goods in Gaza mostly happens underground through the 300 miles of tunnels that Hamas has built using money meant for clean water works and other infrastructure improvements. The success of the operation can be attributed to Hamas's ability to limit the information about the operation and keep it away from Israeli intelligence.

There were occasional comments about Hamas's inclination to do something bigger, but no specific details were given. Hamas spent years convincing the Israeli government that it was looking to create a different dynamic or relationship with the Israeli government. The Israeli government became complacent and turned inward, leading to political divisions and dysfunction within Israel.

The incident was a massive intelligence failure, but it is important to note that intelligence is a human endeavor, and failures can occur. The most cynical and conspiratorial take on the incident is that the Israeli government allowed it to happen to destroy Hamas. However, this theory is not widely accepted.

IDF's Intelligence Failure

The October 7th attack was a massive intelligence failure for the IDF, despite their intense security and surveillance system. The planning of the attack displayed a high level of operational security by limiting the dissemination of information about the operation. This made it difficult for the Israeli intelligence to detect the attack.

The IDF has human sources embedded in Hamas, and they also use communications intercepts and signals intelligence to gather intelligence. However, most of the movement of goods and operatives in Gaza happens underground through the 300 miles of tunnels built by Hamas using funds that were meant for infrastructure and improving schools and hospitals.

The limited number of people within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) were aware of the planning and training of the Hamas operatives. The IRGC is an organization with the Iranian regime, and they manage the training issues and funnel money to Iranian proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah.

The political leadership of Hamas had a sense of the large-scale operation, but the people who really knew about it were the IRGC. They limited the number of sources who knew about the operation, which made it difficult for Israeli intelligence to detect the attack.

There were occasional comments about the inclination of Hamas to do something bigger, but no specific details were given. Hamas spent a great deal of time convincing the Israeli government that they were looking to create a different dynamic or relationship with them. This made the Israeli government complacent, and they turned inward, leading to political divisions and dysfunction.

Overall, the October 7th attack was a massive intelligence failure for the IDF, despite their intense security and surveillance system. The operational security displayed by Hamas made it difficult for Israeli intelligence to detect the attack.

Operational Security of Hamas

Hamas displayed extremely sophisticated operational security during the October 7th attack, which was a massive intelligence failure for the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). Hamas limited the dissemination of information about the operation, which is a good operational security practice. They limited who knew about the operation, and only a handful of people understood the full picture. The political leadership of Hamas may have had a sense of the operation, but the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is an organization with the Iranian regime and a liaison partner for Hamas and Hezbollah, was aware of the planning and training.

Hamas operatives were trained in Iran prior to the attack, and the IRGC managed many training issues and funneled a lot of money to these organizations that are Iranian proxies. Hamas built 300 miles of tunnels in Gaza using money that was probably meant for Clean Water Works and other infrastructure. Hamas limited the number of sources who knew about the operation, which limits the target pool of assets who can provide information from a human perspective.

Hamas displayed excellent operational security by limiting who knew about the operation, which made it difficult for Israeli intelligence to detect the attack. The movement of goods mostly happens underground, which makes it difficult for Israeli surveillance to detect any suspicious activities. The attack was successful because of Hamas' operational security practices.

Role of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

The success of the October 7th attack by Hamas on Israel was largely due to the operational security measures taken by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). The IRGC is an organization with the Iranian regime that manages the training and funding of Hamas and Hezbollah. They limited the dissemination of information about the attack to a handful of people who understood the full picture, thereby keeping it away from Israeli intelligence.

The IRGC trained Hamas operatives in Iran prior to the attack, and only a limited number of people within the IRGC were aware of the planning and training. By limiting who knew about the operation, the IRGC was able to keep it away from Israeli intelligence. The success of the attack was a massive intelligence failure for Israel, despite their intense security system and surveillance.

Hamas spent years convincing the Israeli government that they were looking to create a different dynamic or relationship with Israel, lulling them into complacency. The Israeli government became inward-focused, turning on themselves, and becoming dysfunctional. The political divisions within Israel were in part due to the fact that they didn't feel that the outside threat was as bad as it had been, and they thought Hamas was changing its tune.

The IRGC played a crucial role in the success of the attack, displaying extremely sophisticated operational security measures. They managed to limit the dissemination of information about the attack, which was key to its success.

Political Complacency of the Israeli Government

The Israeli government's political complacency played a significant role in the failure to detect the October 7th operation by Hamas. Hamas had been able to display sophisticated operational security by limiting the dissemination of information about their plans, which prevented Israeli intelligence from detecting the attack. The Israeli government had become complacent over Hamas and the fact that there had not been any terrorist actions for a period of time. This complacency allowed the government to turn inward, leading to political divisions and arguments within the government.

Hamas spent years convincing the Israeli government that it was a new day and that they were looking to create a different dynamic or relationship with the Israeli government. This was a deliberate attempt by Hamas to lull the government into a false sense of security. The Israeli government's complacency allowed Hamas to carry out their attack successfully.

The Israeli government had a highly advanced security system with agents embedded in Hamas, human sources, communications intercepts, signals intelligence, and general surveillance. However, most of Hamas' movement of goods happens underground through the 300 miles of tunnels they have built in Gaza. This made it difficult for Israeli intelligence to detect any suspicious activity.

The failure to detect the operation was a massive intelligence failure, but it is not uncommon for intelligence operations to fail occasionally. The most cynical and conspiratorial take on the situation is that the Israeli government let the operation happen to destroy Hamas. However, this theory is not widely accepted.

Money that was meant for clean water works, infrastructure, and improving schools and hospitals was used to build the tunnels in Gaza. The Hamas leadership structure is enormously wealthy, and they have stolen billions of dollars that were theoretically intended for Palestinian improvements. The money comes from various sources, including the European Union, the United Nations, and the United States.

In conclusion, the Israeli government's political complacency played a significant role in the failure to detect the October 7th operation by Hamas. Hamas was able to display sophisticated operational security, and the Israeli government's complacency allowed them to carry out their attack successfully.

Conspiracy Theories Around the Incident

The intelligence failure on October 7th has led to various conspiracy theories. Some have suggested that the IDF allowed the attack to happen as a way to destroy Hamas. However, this theory is seen as cynical and unlikely by most experts.

It is believed that Hamas displayed extremely sophisticated operational security by limiting the dissemination of information about the attack. This was done by limiting the number of sources who knew about the operation. The political leadership of Hamas may have had a sense of the operation, but only a handful of people understood the full picture.

The IDF has human sources within Gaza, communications intercepts, signals intelligence, and general surveillance in the region. However, most of the movement of goods in Gaza happens underground through the 300 miles of tunnels built by Hamas using money that was meant for infrastructure improvements.

The Israeli government became complacent due to the lack of terrorist actions for a period of time. Hamas spent years convincing the Israeli government that it was a new day and that they were looking to create a different dynamic or relationship with Israel. This was a deliberate attempt by Hamas to lull the Israeli government into a false sense of security.

Overall, the intelligence failure was a massive one. However, intelligence is a human endeavor, and failures can occur despite the best efforts of security systems and surveillance.

Netanyahu's Political Maneuver

The failure of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) to detect the October 7th attack in Gaza was a massive intelligence failure. Despite having agents embedded in Hamas and an intense security and surveillance system, the IDF was unable to detect the attack. The success of the operation was due to the sophisticated operational security displayed by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), the liaison partners for Hamas and Hezbollah, who managed the training and funding of Iranian proxies.

The IRGC limited the dissemination of information about the operation, ensuring that only a limited number of people were aware of the planning and training. This allowed them to keep the operation away from Israeli intelligence. The movement of goods happened underground through the 300 miles of tunnels in Gaza built by Hamas using money intended for infrastructure and improving schools and hospitals.

The political leadership of Hamas had a sense that a large-scale operation was being planned, but only a handful of people understood the full picture of when the operation would take place. The Israeli government became complacent due to the lack of terrorist actions for a period of time and the belief that Hamas was changing its tune. This was a deliberate attempt by Hamas to lull the Israeli government into a false sense of security.

The failure was a massive intelligence failure, but it was not due to a lack of surveillance or signals intelligence intercepts. Intelligence is a human endeavor, and failures can occur no matter how many cameras are used or how good the signals intelligence intercepts are. The most cynical and conspiratorial take on the failure is that the Israeli government let it happen to destroy Hamas, but this is not a credible theory.

The Hamas leadership structure is enormously wealthy, having stolen billions of dollars intended for Palestinian improvements. The money comes from various sources, including the European Union, the United Nations, the US Aid, and other organizations that donate or allocate money for the improvement of Palestinian lives. The failure of the operation was a political maneuver by Netanyahu to galvanize support and maintain power, but this theory is also not credible.

Hamas' Grip on Power and Wealth

Despite the intense security system and surveillance of the region by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF), Hamas was able to carry out the October 7th attack due to a massive intelligence failure. Hamas displayed extremely sophisticated operational security, limiting the dissemination of information about the operation to a select few individuals within the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), who are the liaison partners for Hamas and Hezbollah. They manage the training issues and funnel money that goes to these organizations that are Iranian proxies.

Hamas has built 300 miles of tunnels in Gaza using money that was probably meant for clean water works and other infrastructure. The movement of goods happens mostly underground, making it difficult to monitor. Hamas' grip on power has allowed them to accumulate wealth. Reports suggest that the Hamas leadership structure is enormously wealthy, having stolen billions of dollars meant for Palestinian improvements. The money comes from various sources, including the European Union, the United Nations, UNR W, USAID, and other organizations.

Hamas spent a great deal of time leading up to the attack convincing the Israeli government that they were looking to create a different dynamic or relationship with them. This lull in activity allowed the Israeli government to become complacent, turning inward and causing political divisions within Israel.

In summary, Hamas' grip on power and wealth has allowed them to carry out attacks while limiting the dissemination of information about their operations. They have built an extensive network of tunnels in Gaza and accumulated wealth by stealing money meant for Palestinian improvements. Their ability to lull the Israeli government into complacency has contributed to their success in carrying out attacks.

Funding and Misappropriation of Aid

The funding for infrastructure and improvement projects in Palestine comes from various sources, including the European Union and the United States through organizations such as UNR W and USAID. However, there have been allegations of misappropriation of aid funds by Hamas, the ruling party in Gaza.

Hamas has been accused of using funds meant for improving sanitation, education, and healthcare to build tunnels and fund military operations against Israel. These tunnels, which are used for smuggling weapons and other goods, are estimated to be around 300 miles long. The construction of these tunnels has been funded using money that was meant for improving the lives of Palestinians.

The misappropriation of aid funds by Hamas has not only hindered the progress of infrastructure projects but has also led to a lack of trust from international donors. The international community has become increasingly wary of providing aid to Palestine due to the fear that it may end up in the wrong hands.

Furthermore, the misappropriation of aid funds has also led to a lack of accountability and transparency within the Palestinian government. The lack of oversight and accountability has made it difficult to track where the funds are going and how they are being used.

In conclusion, the misappropriation of aid funds by Hamas has hindered the progress of infrastructure projects and led to a lack of trust from international donors. The lack of oversight and accountability within the Palestinian government has made it difficult to track where the funds are going and how they are being used.